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The EÚ ect of Mergers and Acquisitions on the
Technological Performance of Companies in a
High-tech Environment
JOHN HAGEDOORN & GEERT DUYSTERS
ABSTRACT A large part of the literature from industrial organization and management expects that,
compared with unrelated M&As, related M&As show superior economic performance because of
synergetic eÚects that follow from economies of scale and scope. The current contribution takes the debate
on the eÚect of diÚerent M&As somewhat further by studying the eÚect of M&As on the technological
performance of companies. In this study the technological performance of M&As is related to a high-
tech sector, i.e. the international computer industry. The main result of this research is that the so-called
strategic and organizational t between companies involved in M&As seem to play an important role
in improving the technological performance of companies
Introduction
The central topic of this paper concerns the possible e Ú ect that mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) have on the technological performance of companies. This subject is clearly
related, but not identical, to the more general question regarding the economic bene ts
(pro tability) of M&As. A number of in uential industrial organization studies suggest
that companies realize diminishing pro tability for an extended period of time after an
M&A because of the cost of integration and poor performance of acquired units.1
However, other contributions2 suggest that long-term positive results for M&As are found
for diversi cation through M&As across related product lines.
Largely inspired by Rumelt,3 the management literature has also moved away from
a general evaluation of the economic performance of M&As to an evaluation of di Ú erent
forms of M&As, such as horizontal, vertical and unrelated M&As.4 Although there is still
considerable disagreement within the literature, a substantial part of it expects, primarily
on theoretical grounds, that related M&As show superior performance because of
synergetic e Ú ects through economies of scale and scope.
In this contribution we will attempt to take the debate on M&As somewhat further
by studying their e Ú ect on the technological performance of companies in an international
context. As indicated by Link,5 little research was done on this particular subject before
the late-1980s. In recent years a small number of contributions to the management
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literature6 have put this topic on the research agenda, although the international context
has remained limited.
It is important to note that the technological performance of M&As re ects the long-
term e Ú ects of M&As. Technology related incentives for M&As aÚ ect long-term strategic
variables which tend to be underestimated in much of the current empirical research, that
usually focuses on the short-term, economic e Ú ects ofM&As.7 In these long-term e Ú ects the
expected synergetic characteristics of M&As can contribute to technological performance
through the invention of new process-related technologies and new product-related tech-
nologies by the combined companies. These new technologies (inventions) can eventually
lead to improved pro tability of companies if they are transformed into actual innovations,
i.e. new products and processes that are successfully introduced to the market. There can
also be short-term e Ú ects of M&As when the acquiring company intends to only obtain
access to R&D and technological capabilities to simply produce an already existing, com-
bined technological output. However, when these existing capabilities are used in the
further development of new technological output, these short-term e Ú ects are expected to
be limited in comparison to the long-term, synergetic technological e Ú ects of M&As. This
e Ú ect of merging companies is a well-known classic issue in the innovation literature8 where
increased size of companies and synergies, through internal growth or by means of M&As,
are positively related to long-term technological performance.
The technological e Ú ect ofM&As is also discussed in some previous research on a related
issue, i.e. the motivation forM&As. Frequently mentionedmotives forM&As are: increased
market share, improved e Ý ciency, expanded R&D e Ú orts, investment adjustment,  rm
growth, risk reduction, speedy market entry.9 In older work on M&As from the 1970s,
increasing R&D activities and improving technological performance seem hardly relevant
as motives for M&As.10 Technological motives for M&As appear to be only moderately
important across industries.11 However, other studies12 do suggest that M&As are an impor-
tant element in the technology acquisition strategy of companies, in particular in R&D
intensive (high-tech) industries.Wewill continue along this line and study the e Ú ect ofM&As
on technological performance in a high-tech sector, the computer industry. Obviously,
M&As are also important in other sectors but, as mentioned above, the relation between
M&As and technological performance is probably most evident in high-tech sectors.
In the following we will  rst outline a general perspective on the e Ú ect of M&As on the
technological performance of companies. This general perspective on M&As and the
related set of hypotheses stress the importance of understanding the conditions under which
M&As might have a positive e Ú ect on the technological performance of companies. In
that context we will emphasize the role of strategic and organizational  t in explaining
technological performance di Ú erentials. Although both play a substantial role in many
analyses of M&As and economic performance, strategic and organizational  t have
received far less attention in much of the current work on M&As, technological perfor-
mance and related issues. Apart from this speci c attention paid to the role of strategic and
organizational  t in the technological performance of M&As, a new element in our current
contribution is the international setting of companies and their M&As that goes beyond
the boundaries of domestic markets. After the theoretical background and hypotheses have
been explained, our paper continues with a discussion of our data, the variables and the
measures used in this study. This is followed by sections in which the actual analysis, the
discussion of the results and the conclusions from this paper are presented.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
In a number of seminal contributions to the literature, M&As are seen as an important
element in the overall strategy of companies to respond to uncertainty within the economy
Mergers and Acquisitions: Performance 69
at large, uncertainty within particular industries, or uncertainty in the context of repeated
transactions with other companies.13 The absorption of at least parts of their environment
(i.e. other companies) by means of M&As is one of the alternatives that companies have
if they attempt to reduce uncertainty, increase their control over their environment or
reduce their dependency on this environment. (Other mechanisms that are relevant but
which are not discussed or analyzed in the context of our current research are strategic
alliances that take the form of a variety of legal and organizational modes.) This
absorption of other companies by means of M&As in order to respond to uncertainty
can take place through either the integration of other companies in sector(s) in which a
company is already operating, or a diversi cation into another sector because the
company has become too dependent on its existing environment.14 Studying M&As from
a more sector-speci c perspective, some authors15 arrive at somewhat similar conclusions
as M&As are seen as a mechanism to increase control over the environment of companies
in quickly changing, R&D intensive, industries.
However, increasing control over the current or the new environment of companies
cannot be taken as a goal in itself. The search for new, rewarding opportunities has to
be part of this process of absorption of a company’s environment. As a consequence, in
order for a company to be successful, the objective of increasing control and integration
by means of M&As ultimately has to lead to improved performance. In the context of
companies operating in a high-tech, R&D intensive environment, improved performance
implies that integration by means of M&As has to support the continuous search for new
technological capabilities. We expect that if M&As are successful, they enable companies
to further develop new skills and improve their exploratory learning so as to increase the
technological performance of companies.16
Following some suggestions in the literature17 we propose that in order to be successful
not only in establishing M&As, either in the current environment or in a new environment,
but also to generate the expected results, M&As are contingent upon both a ‘strategic  t’
and an ‘organizational  t’ that enable M&A partners to collaborate in future activities.
This implies that in order to achieve synergetic e Ú ects through M&As, the strategic  t
through market, product and technological complementarities or relatedness of companies
has to be supplemented by an organizational  t in which the organizational structure of
the merging companies appears to match. E Ú ective control over parts of the environment
by means of M&As which also leads to improved performance is expected to be dependent
on this strategic and organizational  t of the companies involved.
In the following we will discuss crucial elements of the strategic and organizational
 t necessary to improve the technological performance of companies in a high-tech
environment, separately. We reconstructed these elements of the strategic and organiza-
tional  t from the literature where these issues are analyzed in the broader context of the
general performance of M&As.18 These conditions for the success of synergetic M&As
are analyzed in terms of strategic  t related to the degree of the existing product-market
relatedness of M&As, the technological relatedness of M&As and their organizational  t.
These diÚ erent elements of the  t between companies cover the current markets of
companies, their present and future-oriented technological activities and the similarity in
their organizational structure.
Strategic Fit: Related and Unrelated M&As
In the literature one  nds several categorizations of M&As in terms of their ‘relatedness’
which usually can be traced back to the original classi cation scheme of the US Federal
Trade Commission.19 Horizontal M&As involve companies that are closely related as to
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the products or services they produce, i.e. both companies operate in the same product-
market. Vertical M&As involve companies that had a potential or existing buyer–seller
relationship prior to the M&A. Conglomerate or unrelated M&As involve essentially
companies that are unrelated in terms of the product-markets in which they are operating
and of which the M&As are part of a widely diversifying strategy.
A substantial part of the literature seems to suggest that in general conglomerate
M&As are less successful than horizontally and vertically-related M&As.20 As shown by
Datta21 there are also studies that  nd little or no evidence of such a relationship. On
theoretical grounds, however, the idea that a strategic  t of companies, in terms of a
relatedness of the product-markets in which companies are operating, remains appealing.
Obviously, related M&As are expected to pro t from economies of scale and scope that
should generate more synergetic bene ts than in the case of unrelated M&As that have
no relationship other than becoming part of one overarching system of corporate control.
As our study focuses not on the economic performance of M&As in general but on
the speci c issue of technological performance, the relationship between the degree of
relatedness of M&As and performance might be of a slightly di Ú erent nature. With
horizontal M&As, we can expect that joint or complementary R&D programs of the
combined companies will generate new technologies in which both scale and scope e Ú ects
seem to be bene cial to the technological performance of the merged companies. For
vertical M&As the expected e Ú ect on technological performance is probably somewhat
less obvious and somewhat more speculative. Cost reduction by means of integrating
upstream or downstream ‘partners’ could generate economic returns that can be partly
reinvested in new technology programs. The integration of downstream user- rms can
also help to identify market needs for new technologies, whereas the integration of
upstream suppliers can bene t the introduction of new process and production tech-
nologies.22 Therefore, the vertical integration of users and suppliers can have a positive
impact on the technological performance of companies. For unrelated M&As, these
e Ú ects of scope and scale economies are in general more di Ý cult to materialize and the
literature suggests that these M&As are mainly intended to achieve  nancial synergies.
This leads us to expect that the degree of relatedness of M&As of both a horizontal or a
vertical nature aÚ ects the technological performance of companies. (However, it has to
be stressed that synergistic results of M&As on which we focus in this paper are
still dependent on positive  nancial economies in order to achieve the necessary
interrelationships. In other words, without short-term economic results for M&As, long-
term results in technological performance may never materialize.)
Under these conditions, the above suggests the following hypothesis:
H.1 There is a positive relationship between the relatedness of M&As of companies and the technological
performance of the combined companies.
Strategic Fit: Technological Relatedness of Companies Involved in M&As
So far, most of the debate on the strategic  t of companies involved in M&As seems to
focus on the industry-aspect of the relatedness of companies in terms of their product-
markets. As our research deals with the technological performance of M&As, it seems
appropriate to also consider the issue of technological relatedness of companies that enter
into M&As. Technological relatedness of companies, then, refers to the degree to which
companies are active in particular  elds of technology that they share with (potential)
partners in M&As. These  elds of technology have to be understood in terms of the
activities of companies related to relatively broad categories of technological disciplines
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and engineering capabilities, such as electronics, electrical engineering, chemistry, bio-
engineering and their sub-categories, that coincide with  elds of technology as for instance
identi ed by patent-classes. As with the line of reasoning for product-markets, we can
expect that the more M&As are established with companies from similar, horizontally
related,  elds of technology and also with technologically, vertically related companies,
the higher the technological performance of the combined companies. Also here, synergies
in scale and scope are the main reasons for expecting these di Ú erent outcomes. Compared
to technologically unrelated M&As, the synergies and combined technological activities
of related M&As are expected to enable companies to shorten the innovation lead-time,
share technological expertise and to engage in larger, combined projects than would be
possible within the once separated companies.
Somewhat surprisingly, the literature on the strategic  t of companies involved in
M&As seems relatively silent on this particular topic. Jemison and Sitkin23 appear to only
hint at the relevance of this aspect of strategic  t. Gerpott24 discusses technological  t in
the context of the successful integration of di Ú erent R&D activities after an acquisition
has taken place. Assuming that the successful integration of diÚ erent R&D activities leads
to improved technological performance, his empirical  ndings suggest that the higher the
degree of technology relatedness of companies involved in an M&A, the more successful
the M&A will be.25 According to this line of thought for understanding the importance
of technological relatedness of M&As, following a similar logic as with product-market
relatedness, we suggest that:
H.2 There is a positive relationship between the technological relatedness of M&As of companies and
the technological performance of the combined companies.
Strategic Fit: Research Intensity of Companies Involved in M&As
The technological aspect of the strategic  t of M&As, discussed in the previous section,
covers the ‘breadth’ of the potential sharing of technological capabilities of companies
across  elds of technology. As far as the ‘depth’ of technological relatedness is concerned,
i.e. the complementarity of their actual research e Ú ort, the question remains whether
companies look for M&A partners that have a similar or preferably a higher level of
research activity. This strategic  t or depth of the technological relatedness expresses the
attempt of M&A-active companies to  nd technologically more advanced partners instead
of technologically less advanced companies.
Early research suggests that companies in mature industries with low R&D intensity
appear to form M&As with companies in R&D-intensive industries in order to diversify
into high-tech areas.26 However, MacDonald27 found no evidence of such dissimilarity.
His research mainly indicates that R&D intensive  rms aim at M&As with companies
from other R&D intensive sectors, that are similar in their R&D orientation in order to
reach synergies in future R&D. Hall28 also mentions the importance of synergistic motives
for explaining M&As in R&D intensive industries. She suggests that R&D intensive
companies form M&As with other R&D intensive  rms whether they are from similar
or from di Ú erent industries.
The above suggests that it is important to consider the e Ú ect of the R&D intensity of
M&A partners on their combined technological output. Then, if one controls for the
research intensity of the sectors in which M&As take place, we can expect that M&As
with companies that have a higher R&D intensity than their sector average tend to lead
to higher technological output. A major motive for M&As with companies of higher
R&D intensity is that these companies can be expected to have certain research
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capabilities and relevant skills that are future-oriented. This is probably important in a
variety of industries but in particular in a high-tech environment where R&D capabilities
are crucial for the further growth and development of companies.29 In other words, the
‘depth’ of this technological relatedness is found in the complementarity of more R&D
intensive M&A partners that are instrumental in creating new knowledge through R&D
that is expected to gradually improve technological performance. Contrary to this, M&As
with companies of lower R&D intensity than their sector average will lead to lower
technological performance of the combined companies. As the combined R&D activity
of these merged companies decreases, we can expect that a gradual erosion of the
technological capabilities of these companies which will be translated into a decreasing
technological performance. Hence:
H.3 There is a positive relationship between the level of R&D intensity of partner-companies in
M&As and the technological performance of the combined companies.
Organizational Fit: Company Size and M&As
Although the concept of organizational  t between companies involved in M&As covers
a large number of aspects related to administrative routines and company-speci c
characteristics,30 in our opinion similarities or diÚ erences in size of companies do, to a
large extent, catch many aspects of organizational  t. Size of companies also relates to
diÚ erences in organizational forms such as multi-divisional company structures and single-
divisional companies that characterize di Ú erences between small and large companies.31 As
a ‘proxy’ for organizational  t we can understand size of companies to express ‘certain
ways of doing business’. In other words, large companies have generally developed a
completely diÚ erent way of organizing themselves, for instance along divisional structures
and other formal organizational routines, that is quite diÚ erent from small and medium
sized companies where informal structures are still most common. This not only applies
to di Ú erences in general, but in particular to the diÚ erent roles that large and small
companies play with regard to technological development.32 This implies that M&As
between companies of diÚ erent sizes have organizational consequences, in terms of the
actual organizational  t of companies, that can a Ú ect the technological output after the
M&A has taken place. There is some evidence that the organizational di Ú erences between
large and some small companies in the actual management of the innovation process are
diminishing,33 but we expect that by and large these diÚ erences still exist. In particular,
we can expect di Ú erent procedures for R&D allocation and diÚ erences in strategic
technology decision-making.
The empirical research seems to support this understanding of the di Ú erences in
organizational  t between large and small  rms. Chakrabarti, Hauschildt and Sueverk-
ruep34 found that combinations of large and small companies are confronted with
organizational problems a Ú ecting technical success after the M&A took place. Similarly,
Gerpott35 established that the size ratio of acquiring and acquired company aÚ ects the
degree to which R&D functions are successfully integrated after an M&A. Smaller ratios
(indicating a merger of companies that are close to being equal in size) are found to be
related to more successful integration, whereas large size diÚ erentials within the M&A
generate major di Ý culties with integrating the R&D activities of M&A partners.
What this part of the empirical literature suggests is that the lack of organizational  t
between companies of di Ú erent size classes has some serious consequences for the
integration of the innovative activities of diÚ erent M&A partners. This seems to contradict
a large part of the literature36 that suggests that the disparity between sizes of merging
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companies might be relatively easy to deal with in case of the integration of manufacturing,
marketing and sales. However, in the complex world of non-routinized and specialized
R&D associated with speci c technological capabilities, organizational integration aimed
at technological performance might be more complex and more di Ý cult to achieve than
improved performance related to largely standard activities such as manufacturing and
sales.37 This implies that, if companies are too far apart in terms of their size and related
aspects of their organizational structure, the realization of improved technological
performance after the M&A might not be as simple as assumed on the basis of simple
arithmetic. In other words, adding up the research and other technological activities of
smaller partners to those of a large company, assuming that the integration process will
take place rather smoothly, underestimates the organizational intricacies of such an M&A
between unequal partners. Hence:
H.4 There is a positive relationship between the degree of similarity in terms of the size of companies
involved in M&As and the post-M&A technological performance of companies.
Methods
Sample
The level of analysis in this study refers to the companies that are engaged in M&As and
not to individual M&As. The main reason for this approach is that technological
performance is generally measured at the level of the company and not at the level of an
individual M&A. In particular for a small acquisition the e Ú ect on the technological
performance of each individual ‘transaction’ is di Ý cult to trace, whereas the combined
e Ú ect of a number of acquisitions of a company is detectable. Also, the registration of
technological performance, e.g. through patents, usually takes place at the level of the
company at large and not at the level of an acquired or merged unit.
As mentioned above, some previous research reveals that M&As are expected to
aÚ ect technological performance of companies, in particular in R&D intensive industries.
We chose companies in the international computer sector as the primary group for the
analysis because of its high-tech character38 and the uncertainty that characterizes
technological and economic development in this industry. In this study the computer
industry consists of companies that produce mainframes and other computers, peripherals,
CAD/CAM/CAE equipment, data communications equipment and other data pro-
cessing products. The uncertainty surrounding the computer industry is well documented
in a large number of popular publications and in the academic literature.39 These
uncertain conditions are caused by endogenous technological change within the industry
itself, the dependence on technological developments in the supplying micro-electronics
and other components industries and the convergence of computer and telecom technol-
ogies which has led to lateral entry in both industries.40 The above implies that we
analyze the e Ú ect of M&As on the technological performance of these computer
companies whereas the M&As in which these companies are involved might of course be
related to a variety of manufacturing industries. We excluded service related M&As from
the analysis, including software related M&As. These service activities do generate
technological development, however, they are also known to create few technical inven-
tions in terms of codi ed knowledge that can only be partly measured by means of
patents or similar indicators.
The above implies that, as in so many other somewhat comparable studies, we use a
single-industry design, albeit with a choice for a large and international sector with a
substantial number of M&As, to control for potential industry e Ú ects. We study the e Ú ect
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of a total number of 201 M&As, made during the period 1986–1992, in a sample of 35
companies. Thirty of these companies have their headquarters in the USA, three
companies are from Asian countries and two companies are European. These 35
companies (see Appendix 1) with M&As, are taken from a total of 100 companies that
account for more than 90% of the international computer market.41 In terms of market
share, the 35 M&A-active companies in our sample represent nearly 70% of the
international computer market. The other 65 companies, all relatively small  rms, did
not have any M&A during the period under investigation. Given the major diÚ erences
between these sub-populations, in terms of the size of companies and their relevance to
the computer industry, it is impossible to use the other sub-population as a control group.
Variables
We took the patent intensity growth of US patents of the companies in the sample from
1989 to 1994 as an indicator of the dependent variable technological performance. We use
the number of patents that  rms applied for in all IPC classes to measure their
technological performance. As with so many other indicators, this patent indicator is
subject to a debate regarding its bias and shortcomings.42 However, despite some
shortcomings it is generally accepted as the most appropriate indicator that enables us to
compare the technological performance of companies.43 Even authors that are critical of
the overall use of patents as an indicator of technological performance or innovation,
admit that they are appropriate in the context of the current, high-tech sector.44 Also, the
less patents are used for cross-sectional analysis that ignores inter-sectoral di Ú erences in
the propensity to patent, the better this indicator re ects the technological performance
of companies.
As the size of companies will aÚ ect the technological performance of companies, as
suggested by many studies, we will take the growth in ‘patent intensity’ (the ratio of the
number of patents and total revenues) as the actual dependent variable.
The time-lag between M&As and the change in technological performance covers an
average period of six years (from the mean of the years for the independent variables,
1989, to the  nal year for which the changes in technological performance is measured,
1994). According to Singh, and Buono and Bowditch45 it takes on average nearly  ve
years before organizations are assimilated and gains of the M&A are materialized. These
studies, however, also indicate considerable variation in the assimilation process as some
companies are able to unify their organizations within one year whereas it takes others
substantially longer than the average of  ve years. According to Scherer, and Pakes and
Griliches46 it takes on average about one year before inventions through R&D lead to
patent applications. Taken together these two periods add up to an average time lag of
about six years.
Given the degree of variance found for both the period of organizational assimilation
and the e Ú ective time-span from R&D to patent application, as reported in previous
research, we experimented with several alternative analyses. We used shorter intervals as
well as diÚ erent time lags, without compromising the size of the sample. The outcomes
of these alternative analyses were similar to the results presented in this paper.
In the statistical analysis presented below we will apply the following independent
variables:
Related and unrelated (conglomerate) M&As are measured in terms of the (dis)similarity of the
SIC code of the industries of M&A partners at the three digit level.47 For related M&As
in the computer industry we constructed a list of related SICs (see Appendix II) based
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on a number of in-depth studies of the computer industry and related industries.48 This
list of related SICs was presented to a small group of senior specialists from the computer
industry who all con rmed that these industries are generally accepted as related
industries. For each M&A the SIC code of the target company was obtained through
Securities Data’s database on M&As (see section on Data sources). The actual measure
being used for each computer company in the sample is the share of its related M&As
as a percentage of all its M&As.
Technologically related and technologically unrelated M&As are measured in terms of the
(dis)similarity of the patent classi cation (IPC) code of the patents owned by the M&A
partners at the three digit level. These patent classes represent the generally accepted
perception of  elds of technology by scientists and engineers to a similar degree as for
instance industrial classes represent generally accepted classi cations of industries by
economists and management scholars.49 For technologically related M&As we constructed
a list of related IPCs (see Appendix 3). The same group of specialists from the computer
industry that we consulted on industry relatedness con rmed that the patent classes taken
to measure technological relatedness could be used to indicate the technological relat-
edness of M&As. If the majority of the M&A target’s patents falls in related IPC classes,
then the target company is considered to be technologically related. The actual measure
for each company is the share of technologically related M&As as a percentage of all its
M&As.
R&D intensity of M&A partners is measured as the ratio of the R&D intensity of the M&A
partners, based on their average R&D expenditures of the two years before the M&A,
controlling for the average sector R&D intensity. We calculated this variable as follows.
We  rst assessed the R&D intensity of each single  rm against its industry average. If,
e.g. a target company has a 1.5 higher R&D intensity than the industry average, the
value of that ratio would be 1.5. Then, in order to arrive at one overall ratio for the
combined set of M&As we added up the ratios and divided this number by the number
of M&As. This overall ratio of the combined M&As is divided by the ratio of the acquirer.
This  nal measure is the value of the variable in the analysis. For example, if the acquirer
has a ratio of 0.5 (half the intensity of the industry average) and the combined set of
targets have a ratio of 1.5 then the value of this variable is 3. The ratio of the acquired
 rm is three times higher than that of the acquiring  rm, i.e. the ratio is 3 (1.5 divided
by 0.5). Thus, the higher the value of this measure, the higher the R&D intensity of the
target(s) in comparison to the R&D intensity of the acquirer.
Similarity of size of M&A partners refers to the ratio of the size of both companies involved
in the M&A. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total revenues in the year
before the M&A. Logarithms are taken to correct for a small number of very large
companies. We divided the size of the acquiring  rm by the size of the target  rm.
Because in all the cases the acquiring  rm was the larger of the two, a lower ratio implies
more similarity among the  rms. The ratios of size for companies with a number of
M&As are also added up and divided by the number of their M&As.
Control Variables
The R&D intensity of the companies in the sample (1986–1992), i.e. R&D expenditures
as a share of total revenues, is taken as a control variable because we expect a direct
e Ú ect of R&D on patent activity as research e Ú orts will (at least partly) be transformed
into patents. In the literature the relation between R&D and patents has been studied
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extensively. Kamien and Schwartz50 have established that on average there is a direct
relation between inventive e Ú ort or input and technological output. However, it is added
that other factors can in uence the transformation and the relation may not be linear.
In some studies51 it is mentioned that patenting output decreases gradually with an
increase of R&D expenditures.
Research on the e Ú ect of the internationalization of innovative activities through
international M&As suggests both positive and negative e Ú ects of this international
diversi cation on technological performance, but the positive e Ú ects seem to be domi-
nant.52 These positive e Ú ects are largely due to diÚ erent local advantages generated by
international R&D sourcing through acquired companies. Therefore, we will control for
the international and domestic character of the M&As of the companies in the sample.
The international and domestic character of the M&As of a company is determined by
the share of international M&As in the total number of its M&As as registered according
to the home country of the headquarters of companies during the period 1986–1992.
A third control variable that we introduce relates to the possible e Ú ect of experience
with establishing of M&As on the performance of M&As. It is well known that one of the
main problems for companies active in the  eld of M&As is the di Ý cult task of acquiring
adequate information on target  rms. It is obvious that, depending on the situation,
target companies might have an incentive to somewhat misrepresent their innovative
potential by overstating or understating their technological capabilities and the value of
their research programs. This ‘inspection problem’ with M&As or the problem of the
possible lack of adequate information can be solved partially by experience as companies
establish some routines and learning capabilities regarding the valuation of other
companies. As suggested in the literature53 companies that have built up some experience
in M&As might  nd it easier to assess the value of target  rms. Experience with the
actual incorporation of the R&D programs of other companies in the overall technology
strategy will also help to improve the post-M&A performance. This suggests that
experienced M&A active  rms have higher post-merger technological performance than
inexperienced companies. Experience with M&As is measured by taking the natural
logarithm of the number of M&As made during the seven years period from 1986 to
1992. We would have preferred a longer period or a period prior to the one for the other
dependent variables but unfortunately there are no earlier international data available.
Data Sources
Data on M&As for the period 1986–1992 is derived from a data bank owned by
Securities Data, which we used via on-line access. This data bank contains information
on worldwide M&As. Within this database there is information on the year the M&A
was established and company information on the acquirer, the target, the parent acquirer
and the parent target  rm. The industry information is provided in SIC codes of the
acquiree and acquirer.
Data for the size of companies and their R&D expenditures is taken from several
issues of Gartner Group’s annual Yardstick top 100 worldwide covering a period from
the early 1980s to the early 1990s. The Yardstick top 100 worldwide is an authoritative
statistical review of the international computer industry comprising the top 100 computer
companies. Data in the Yardstick was updated annually through surveys and research by
Gartner Group consultants and industry analysts. When data was missing, estimates were
taken from industry analyst input and from other available industry sources. The Yardstick
contains calendar year information, not information based upon  scal years, which allows
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us to make better comparisons between companies. Also, the Gartner data is adjusted
for the e Ú ect of currency exchange rates.
We obtained additional data on R&D, size and revenues of companies involved in
M&As through well-known databases such as Compustat, Disclosure and Worldscope.
We used Dun and Bradstreet’s Global Linkages to track the subsidiaries of each company
in our sample in order to include patents that were  led by some of these subsidiaries.
The data on patents for the dependent variable (technological performance) is taken
from the US Patent and Trademark O Ý ce database (US Department of Commerce).
Although this US data could imply a bias in favour of US companies and against non-
US  rms, the group of non-US companies in this sample represents a group of innovative
and rather large  rms that are known to patent worldwide. Furthermore, the literature
suggests several other reasons to take US patents as an indicator. Frequently mentioned
are the importance of the US market, the ‘real’ patent protection o Ú ered by US
authorities, the level of technological sophistication of the US market which makes it
almost compulsory for non-US companies to  le patents in the USA.54
Analysis
In order to test the hypotheses we applied a standard ordinary least square regression
model (see Table 2). The correlations in Table 1 do not suggest multi-collinearity.
However, given the relatively high R2 of the model we undertook some additional tests
to detect possible multi-collinearity. We regressed each independent variable on all the
other independent variables55—this test did not indicate multi-collinearity. In addition,
we used a number of other multi-collinearity diagnostics, taking a closer look at VIF and
Tolerance value statistics, which also did not detect any signs of multi-collinearity.
Table 2 demonstrates that hypothesis 1 is supported as our analysis generates a
signi cant, positive relationship between the degree to which companies use related
M&As and their technological performance. Hypothesis 2, which concerns technological
relatedness, is also supported as we found a statistically signi cant and positive e Ú ect of
these technologically related M&As on the technological performance of companies. Our
other results show that the acquisition and merging of companies with higher R&D
intensity signi cantly improves the technological performance of the acquiring  rm
(hypothesis 3 is con rmed). Also, the expected relationship between the degree of
similarity in terms of the size of companies involved in M&As and the technological
performance of the acquiring  rms (hypothesis 4) was indeed established in our analysis
(lower scores are associated with greater similarity).
The control variable for the R&D intensity of companies seems to have a signi cant,
albeit negative, impact on the improved technological performance of companies. This
indicates that, as already found in other contributions discussed in the above, patenting
output decreases with an increase of R&D expenditures. In other words, an increase in
R&D intensity of companies does not imply a parallel growth in technological perfor-
mance. Our  ndings for the second control variable suggest that, as found in some
previous research, international M&As improve the technological performance of com-
panies. However, extensive experience of companies with M&As does not seem to
in uence their technological performance.
Discussion
Our analysis demonstrates that major aspects of the strategic and organizational  t of
companies engaged in M&As seem important for generating improved technological
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Table 2. Regression estimates of the in uence of M&As
(1986–1992) on the technological performance of companies
(growth of patent intensity, 1989–1994) in the international
computer industry, n 5 35
Variables Beta T
Constant 2 1.15
Related M&As 0.607 4.88***
Technologically related M&As 0.293 1.80*
R&D intensity of M&A partners 1.056 5.68***
Similarity of size of M&A partners 2 0.362 2 2.16**
International character of M&As 0.306 2.17**
Experience with M&As 0.186 1.26
R&D intensity of company 2 0.522 2 3.53***
*p< 0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
R2 5 0.888; Adj R2 5 0.790; Std Error 5 0.00537; F 5 9.064; Sign. F 5 0.003.
Regression (df ) 5 7; error (df ) 5 28; Total (df ) 5 35.
performance in an international high-tech environment. Our  ndings suggest that the
strategic  t between companies in related product markets increases the innovative
potential of M&As. This  nding adds additional support to much of the empirical
evidence of previous research on the economic performance of M&As that indicates that
related diversi cation through M&As is more bene cial to companies than unrelated
diversi cation.56 The role of this particular aspect of the strategic  t of companies in
explaining performance improvement supports much of the conventional wisdom from,
for example, economics regarding the economies of scale and scope that companies can
achieve when they expand into related activities. The strategic  t of M&As in terms of
broad product-market categories seems to generate a baseline for joint activities that
secures the overall relevance of the M&As to the improved performance of the combined
companies. However, it is important to note that this aspect of the strategic  t is still
largely related to the existing activities of companies, whereas the technological capabilities
of merging companies are expected to be also dependent on future-oriented technological
aspects of their strategic  t.
It appears that linking up to more R&D intensive companies generates strong results
in terms of higher technological performance. We recall that some of the older literatures57
already indicated that M&As with R&D intensive  rms would enable acquiring companies
to increase control over high-tech environments that are relevant to them. When
companies establish M&As with other companies of higher R&D intensity, this implies
that they are integrating partners that are more likely to be engaged in new activities,
which adds to the formation of new capabilities and learning skills within the new entity.
In other words, these R&D intensive M&As are instrumental to the more general process
of exploratory learning58 and they play an important role in the improvement of
technological competencies that are crucial for companies to remain competitive in a
high-tech environment.59
It is obvious that the ‘depth’ of the technological relatedness of M&As, i.e. the
complementarity in higher R&D e Ú orts, aÚ ects the increased R&D potential of the
combined companies. When companies engage in M&As with companies with higher
R&D inputs, the M&As are expected to be future oriented as the increased R&D intensity
of these companies focuses on the search for new technologies, products and processes.
These R&D increasing M&As have a long term, strategic e Ú ect that we found to lead to
improved technological performance of the combined companies.
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The e Ú ect of technologically related M&As is only marginally signi cant and the
statistical support is weaker than for the other variables. In that context it is important
to note that there is considerable chance of duplication of existing technological capabili-
ties, with a similar ‘breadth’ of technological relatedness of companies, when they only
share broad patenting pro les based on previous technological achievements. In that
case, there could be fewer learning opportunities and companies could have more
di Ý culty engaging in new activities and developing new technological capabilities that
will lead to improved technological performance. In other words, unlike the ‘depth’ of
technological relatedness, the ‘breadth’ of technological relatedness of M&As merely
re ects the status quo of the technological capabilities of companies and this expansion
through technologically similar M&As can be expected to only have a marginal e Ú ect on
the improved technological performance of  rms. Combining companies with similar
technological capabilities and a somewhat similar technological track record merely
duplicates existing capabilities that only have a limited impact on the future technological
performance of the combined companies.60
The organizational  t of companies, their similarity in size, which we found to be
important to explain improved technological performance, seems to bene t the actual
integration process of merging companies. Previous research61 already mentioned that
large diÚ erences in size of companies indicate dissimilarities in the organizational setting
of partners, which might frustrate the actual post-merger integration process. From the
perspective of the technological performance of M&As, our research shows that a large
diÚ erence in size of companies, indicating a poor organizational  t, generates weaker
performance than in the case of greater organizational similarity of partners. The popular
business literature provides many examples from high-tech industries (in particular
biotechnology, software, microelectronics and computers) where large companies have
great di Ý culty in integrating small companies with a diÚ erent ‘culture’ while keeping
key-employees from these acquisitions ‘on board’.
Although not directly related to the e Ú ect of strategic and organizational  t on the
technological performance of companies, our research suggests some interesting results
for international M&As and the e Ú ect of experience with M&As on technological
performance. It appears that companies that have a preference for international M&As,
that bene t from several international R&D sources and from di Ú erent regionally
concentrated technological competencies, improve their technological performance. As
discussed in the above this highlights the importance of international learning through
M&As as being very important for companies in a high-tech environment that has also
become highly internationalized.62
Somewhat surprisingly, we found no clear evidence of the positive e Ú ect of the experi-
ence of companies through a larger number of M&As. Increasing the number of M&As
does not seem to necessarily improve the performance of companies in a linear way. How-
ever, most companies in this sample have some experience with M&As as they made more
than oneM&A in a few years.What this  nding does indicate is that, if there is an experience
e Ú ect regarding M&As at all, the e Ú ect of increased experience would most probably wear
o Ú beyond a rather low threshold. Also, as suggested by Hitt et al.,63 for companies to learn
from their M&As, the sheer number of M&As could be less decisive than their e Ú ective
learning capability with regard to M&As and other external sources of innovation.
Conclusions
Our study focuses on a single, high-tech industry, albeit a large one and with an
international population consisting of a variety of companies, that are studied for a period
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of nearly a decade. As our results might re ect some industry and period-speci c factors,
elaboration of the study in di Ú erent settings could generate useful additional insights.
With this caveat in mind, we can draw the following conclusions.
Our research demonstrates that M&As can contribute to improving the technological
performance of companies in a high-tech environment. However, it has to be stressed
that both the organizational and the strategic  t of the companies involved in these
M&As are crucial for the technological success of M&As. These critical factors were
already discussed in some earlier contributions that concentrated mainly on the general
e Ú ect of M&As on economic performance and pro tability. Not only does our current
research establish the important role that organizational and strategic  t seem to also
have for the technological performance of M&A-active companies, it in particular
emphasizes the importance of linking-up with more research-intensive companies. This
suggests that the acquisition of these companies, through which the acquiring company
can improve its technological skills and expected learning capabilities, has a positive
e Ú ect on the technological performance of acquiring companies after M&As have
taken place.
The current contribution does not investigate the short-term economic bene ts of
M&As but it concentrates on the technological performance of companies that might
have long-term strategic consequences, eventually leading to increased economic perfor-
mance. In that context the M&As can be interpreted as an attempt of companies to
increase both control over their environment in order to respond to uncertainty and to
improve their performance. The successful integration of other companies in a familiar
environment and the search for new opportunities through M&As are both mentioned
in that context as major mechanisms in a two-fold strategy to improve technological
performance. The relevance of market relatedness of M&As stresses the importance of
uncertainty reduction by means of integration of companies that are active in similar
sectors and that have some similarity in terms of product-markets. The integration of
R&D intensive companies, however, creates the necessary new skills and capabilities that
enable the company to learn about new perspectives that can decrease its dependency
on its existing environment and improve its performance. Therefore, the external
acquisition of technological capabilities by means of M&As can, if proper attention is
paid to the strategic and organizational  t of companies, prove to be an important
strategic advantage for companies in high-tech sectors.
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Appendix 1. Companies in the Analysis
3Com Exabyte Network Systems
Acer Fujitsu Olivetti
Apple General DataComm Recognition Equipment
AST Research Genicom Seagate
Cadence Gerber Scienti c Sequent
Compaq Groupe Bull Silicon Graphics
Conner IBM Storage Tech
Control Data Systems Intergraph Sun Microsystems
Cray Research Maxtor Tandem
Data General Mentor Graphics Unisys
Digital Equipment National Computer Systems Wang
Digital Communications NEC
Appendix 2. Related and Unrelated M&As According to SIC Codes of
Partners
Related M&As are between companies that are both found in the following SIC classes:
357. Computer and o Ý ce equipment
366. Communications equipment
367. Electronic components and accessories
369. Miscellaneous electrical machinery, equipment and supplies (batteries, disk, tape)
382. Measuring and controlling devices
All other cases refer to unrelated M&As.
Appendix 3. Technologically Related and Unrelated M&As According to
Patent Classi cation of Patents of Partners
Technologically related M&As are between companies of which the patents correspond
with the following IPC classes:
Seq. No.
(IPC code) Description
27 O Ý ce computing and accounting machines
40 Miscellaneous electrical machinery, equipment and supplies
43 Electronic components and accessories and communications equipment
55 Professional and scienti c instruments
All other cases refer to technologically unrelated M&As.
